"Nehru reposed great faith in ' …

As a leader of NAM, India’s response to the ongoing Cold War was two-fold: At one level, it took particular care in staying away from the two alliances. Second, it raised its voice against the newly decolonised countries becoming part of these alliances.

India’s policy was neither negative nor passive. As Nehru reminded the world, non- alignment was not a policy of ‘fleeing away’. On the contrary, India was in favour of actively intervening in world affairs to soften Cold War rivalries. India tried to reduce the differences between the alliances and thereby prevent differences from escalating into a full-scale war. Indian diplomats and leaders were often used to communicate and mediate between Cold War rivals such as in the Korean War in the early 1950s.

It is important to remember that India chose to involve other members of the non-aligned group in this mission. During the Cold War, India repeatedly tried to

activate those regional and international organisations, which were not a part of the alliances led by the US and USSR. Nehru reposed great faith in ‘a genuine commonwealth of free and cooperating nations’ that would play a positive role in softening, if not ending, the Cold War.

Non-alignment was not, as some suggest, a noble international cause which had little to do with India’s real interests. A non-aligned posture also served India’s interests very directly, in at least two ways:

    First, non-alignment allowed India to take international decisions and stances that served its interests rather than the interests of the superpowers and their allies.
    Second, India was often able to balance one superpower against the other. If India felt ignored or unduly pressurised by one superpower, it could tilt towards the other. Neither alliance system could take India for granted or bully it.

India’s policy of non-alignment was criticised on a number of counts. Here we may refer to only two criticisms:

    First, India’s non-alignment was said to be ‘unprincipled’. In the name of pursuing its national interest, India, it was said, often refused to take a firm stand on crucial international issues.
    Second, it is suggested that India was inconsistent and took contradictory postures. Having criticised others for joining alliances, India signed the Treaty of Friendship in August 1971 with the USSR for 20 years. This was regarded, particularly by outside observers, as virtually joining the Soviet alliance system. The Indian government’s view was that India needed diplomatic and possibly military support during the Bangladesh crisis and that in any case the treaty did not stop India from having good relations with other countries including the US

Non-alignment as a strategy evolved in the Cold War context. As we will see in Chapter 2, with the disintegration of the USSR and the end of the Cold War in 1991, non-alignment, both as an international movement and as the core of India’s foreign policy, lost some of its earlier relevance and effectiveness. However, non-

alignment contained some core values and enduring ideas. It was based on a recognition that decolonised states share a historical affiliation and can become a powerful force if they come together. It meant that the poor and often very small countries of the world need not become followers of any of the big powers, that they could pursue an independent foreign policy. It was also based on a resolve to democratise the international system by thinking about an alternative world order to redress existing inequities. These core ideas remain relevant even after the Cold War has ended.